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ABSTRACT
Central banks and private banks alike have advocated greater useofinterbank netting agreements
in recentyears in order to reducepotential for transmitting economic shocks through interbank
markets. This paperprovides a model ofan interbank payment market and shows that oneside-
effect of greater netting ofinterbank claims is a redistribution of bank default risk away from
interbank claimants toward non-bank creditors ofbanks, including the depositinsurer. Interbank
netting agreements thusinvolve a trade-offbetween reduced interbank credit-risk exposure and
increased concentration ofbank default risk on other sets ofbank creditors.
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The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Actof 1991 (FDICIA)provided
support fornetting contracts amongbanks andother regulated financial institutions in order to
lessen systemic risk (Parkinson 1993, p. 63; Wall 1993, p. 5). Important types of interbank
netting agreements include bilateral payments netting, multilateralpayment systems with net
settlement, andmaster derivativeagreements. Proponents of these netting agreements point out
that netting generally reduces the interbank credit exposuresfaced by individual banks. Thus, a
liquidity or solvency problematone bank is less likely to create a“domino effect”in the
interbank market since the transmission channels for such ashock have beenreduced in absolute
magnitude. In the case of multilateral netting, the average reduction in credit-risk exposures
faced by banks after netting maybe of an order ofmagnitude or more.
The proposition that interbank netting reduces systemic risk has an important corollary that is
often left unstated. The corollary is that, as aresult of interbank netting agreements, bank default
risk is redistributed to those participating banks’ creditors whose claims are not includedin the
netting agreement. These excluded creditors may consist of uninsured depositors and other non-
bank liability holders, respondent banks, holders of various types of bank equity securities, the
centralbank, and, of course, the deposit insurer andultimately the taxpayer. If any of these
creditor classes are unsuited forrisk-bearing or are not properly compensated for the increased
risksthey bear, thenthe risk-shifting aspect ofinterbank netting schemes presents anegative
offset to the benefits associated with them.
This paper provides amodel of an interbankpayments market and then characterizes the
redistribution of bank default risk that arises from interbank netting agreements. The paperidentifies the efficiency trade-offs that accompany netting agreements, making explicit the
substitution of concentrated bank default-risk exposure for reducedinterbank, or systemic, risk
exposure. To highlight the redistributiveaspects of interbank netting agreements, I posit avery
simple liability structure forbanks, consisting only of insured non-bank deposits, uninsured
interbank claims, and equity. It becomes clear in thisframework that the direct economic losses
that cause a bank to fail (e.g., loan losses) cannot be eliminated by interbank agreements,
although they may be redistributed. Thus, the case forinterbank netting agreements can be recast
as a statement about the relativeefficiency of various risk-sharing arrangements in the banking
system. This applies equally to payments and over-the-counterfinancial marketsthat utilize
interbank netting agreements.
The main result of the paper implies that interbank netting agreements are beneficial only ifthe
holders of non-netted claims on a failing bank-- in this model, the deposit insurer-- can more
efficiently bear the losses caused by the bank’s failure by themselves than could the bank’s
creditors as a whole. Stated in this way, it is clear that commonly expressed arguments in favor
ofinterbank netting agreements are attheir core also statements about the relative risk-bearing
capabilities of various agents and institutions. It is quite possible that concentrated risk-bearing
is beneficial on balance, since thisprovides incentives for effective delegated monitoring.
However, it bears pointing out that the endorsement of interbanknetting agreements, such as that
contained in FDICIA, implies the acceptance ofan heightened degree of responsibility on the
part of the deposit insurer and othernon-bank creditors forthe risksincurred in, and more
broadly, the stability of, the banking system.
The first section of the paper describes a simple model of interbank payments without netting
agreements, acentralbank, or deposit insurance. Section II adds adeposit insurer and shows that
2“delegated monitoring” by this institution on behalfofdepositors generates important efficiency
gains. Section III illustrates bothbilateral and multilateral interbank netting agreements in an
economy with deposit insurance, pointing outhow these arrangements alterthe ex ante
distribution of bank defaultrisk. Section IV illustrates the main result ofthe paper with a small-
scaleexample. The role of acentral bank in the interbank payment system is discussed briefly.
The paper’s final section concludes.
I. AModelofInterbank Payments
This section describes a model of interbank payments without deposit insurance, netting
agreements, or acentral bank. Subsequent sections addressthese arangements, in turn.
Agents. The model economy lasts for two periods and consistsof a largenumber of risk-neutral
agents who are identical at T=O, the beginning of the first period. The economy’s agents are
initially uniformly geographically dispersed amongNneighborhoods, each ofwhich contains M
members. Hence, thereare MN agents in all. Eachagent begins with one unit of aconsumption
good and seeksto maximize his or her consumptionof the good atthe endof period two, T=2.
The rate of time discounting ofconsumption is zero.
Each agentreceives an idiosyncratic “geographic-preference shock” at the beginnning of period
one (which lasts from T=O and T=1) indicating the neighborhood to which the agentmust move
in order to derive utility from consumptionat T=2.’ Ex ante, each agent is equally likely to
prefer any one ofthe economy’s otherN-i neighborhoods over his or her original location. The
number of agents who wish to move from any given neighborhood ito anotherneighborhoodj in
the economy is given by x~ E ~O,M],i,j=1 N, where x~ = 0, and = M foreach i. A
3complete descriptionof the movements of agents originating in any neighborhood i is given by
{x11 ,x12
, ..., XiN}, whileasummary of the agents arriving in neighborhood i is given by
~
Let the expected number of agents that wish to move from neighborhood ito any other
neighborhoodj, E[x~ J, be denoted X, whichclearly lies between zero andM. This quantity is
the gross expected movement of agents from one location to another. We will also have
occasion to discuss the net expected movements of agents within the economy under two
differentnetting assumptions. I will let X denote the net expected movement ofagents between
any given neighborhood i and another neighborhoodj, while X will denote the net expected
movement of agents between anygiven neighborhood i and all other neighborhoods. These two
quantities, defined as E{~x~ — x11 ] and E[~~ (x~ — x1~ ~],respectively, are both positive, even
though E[x~ — x11] = 0 and (x~ — x1~)] =0. In words, the expected net movement of
agents between neighborhoods i andj in one direction orthe other, as well as the expected net
movement between any given neighborhood i and all otherneighborhoods considered as a
whole, are both greaterthanzero. This is true even though no neighborhood experiences anet
increase or decreasein its population in expectation. The important implication of these facts is
that non-zero amounts of interbank settlement can be expectedto occur even in asymmetric
economy such as the oneenvisioned here. Note that 0 < X < X<X < M, andthat, if we let
{XN } represent a sequence of expectations as Nbecomes large, then lirn XN = 0, as an
application ofthe law of large numbers.
4Transporting the Good. Transporting the good from one neighborhood to another is costly. An
amount S. 0 < S < 1, is lostper unit ofthe good as soon as it is movedfrom its initial
neighborhood.2 This deadweightcost is incurred at most once. In autarky (i.e., withoutbanks) at
T=0, each agent’sexpected utility of consumptionat T=2 is therefore equal to the value ofhis or
her endowment less the expected cost of moving itto anotherneighborhood, i-S.
Banks. I assume that each neighborhood in the economy is served by a single profit-maximizing
bank whose initial endowment consists of safe-keeping facilitiesand access toarisky lending
opportunity ifdeposit funding becomes available (i.e., ifagents choose to deposit their
endowment goods atbanks). LetZ1 denote the risky payoff to bank i’s loan if funded at T=0. I
assume that the value ofthe loan follows some continuous processbetween T=0 and T=2 andthat
the creditors and/orregulators ofthe bank are able to monitorand seize the asset as soon as its
value fallsto acritical level,4 , which causes bank i’s net worth--net of all costs associated
with interbank settlement and creditors’ liquidation costs, ifpositive-- to equal zero. At T=0,
each bank’s probability of failing by T=2 isf, 0<f<i. As long as Z1 remains above the critical
level, no intervention is undertaken. In what follows, I will examine the situationthat results
from the failure of asingle bank; the first failure of abank therefore defines the “end” ofthis
economy (T=2).
Eachbank accepts deposits of the consumption good from all local agents at T=0 (subject to
voluntary-participation andincentive-compatibility constraints) and issues receipts against these
deposits that promise the amountR of the good at T=2. Banks in this economy collectively
constitute apaymentsystem in the sensethat I assume they are able toprecommit to issuing new
5deposit receipts of their own in exchange for the deposit receipts of other banks delivered to
themby newly arriving agents. Since all banks are identical ex ante and interbank co-operation
raises expected profits, it is reasonable for all banks to agree to participate in this payment
arrangement so long as there are enforcementmechanisms ensuringthat no individual bank, or a
subset ofbanks, will defect at T=i by refusing to exchange anotherbank’s deposits atpar. It is
this web of co-operativeagreements-- perhaps re-inforced by statute or regulation-- that
characterizes the uniqueinterdependent nature of paymentsystems. Although this nexus of
explicit and implicit contracts represents an interesting future research topic, I simply assume for
present purposes that depositors andbanks fully expect to trade deposit receipts issued by
various banks atpar.
Consistent with my assumption that banks are local monopolists, I assume that agents who
deposit their consumption good at T=0 receive only their reservationutility in expectation. With
banks operating under aregime ofno deposit insurance, each agent holding the deposit receiptof
a failed bank must seek to recoverhis or her endowment; this expected liquidation costisfL per
agent. The agents’ voluntary-participation constraint thus requires abank deposit contract net of
expected liquidation costs, R-JL, to provide in expectation at least the valueof his or her
endowment less the costofmoving it to anotherneighborhood, 1-S. Therefore, participationof
all agents will be assured by banks promising R+JL=l-S+JL when no deposit insurance exists.
With deposit insurance, depositors demandonly R=l-S.
Gross settlement of interbankpayments occurs as follows. At T=0, anygiven bank i’s balance
sheet consists only of the risky loan, deposits,and owner’s equity (a residual of loanvalue over
deposit promises, since the bankercontributes no equity of his own):
6Bank i’s Balance Sheet at T=0
Risky loan M(R+JL) Initialdeposit obligations
NW0 Net worth
The risky loan will pay offin period two, so its value at T=O-- and therefore, the bank’s net
worth-- is arandom variable. Thebank’s initial deposit obligations are to the M depositors who
originate in neighborhood i and who will move to the other N- 1 neighborhoods in the economy.
Bank i’s depositors will take their deposit receipts with them and tradethem fordeposits in their
new location.
Geographic-preference shocks are realized andacted upon in period one. Upon arrival in
neighborhoodj at T=i, the holder of adeposit receipt frombank i trades the bank i deposit fora
bankj deposit, whichpromises an amount R+JL of the consumption good in neighborhoodj at
T=2. Eachbank’s original deposit obligations can now be specified as due-to balances that will
be collected by the other banks in the economy at T=2 (in amount ~ x~ (R + JL)). Depositor
arrivals, meanwhile, generate both a set ofN-i interbank claims in favor of bank i (valuedat
xfl (R + JL)(1 — 5), since settlement costs are incurred by due-from banks) and aset of
additional deposit obligations to the newlyarrived agents (with face value ~ x1,(R + fL)).3
Since no informationhas arrived about the values ofbanks’ risky loans, expectations about
banks’ net worth remain unchanged. Bank i’s balance sheet thus appears as follows:
7Bank i’s Balance Sheet at T—i
Loan value Z1
N Initial deposit obligations
~,x0(R+fL)
= Due-to balances




To complete the description ofinterbank payments without netting agreements or deposit
insurance,I must specify liquidation costs and failure-resolution procedures. Eachbank in the
economy is subject to failure because it invests the consumptiongood deposited with it in arisky
project. Although abankcould, in principle, also fail as aresult of losses it suffers on its
interbank claims, I rule out thispossibility in what follows. Assigning aprobability of zero to a
“domino-effect” scenario appears reasonable for two reasons in the present context: 1) a
domino effect is not necessary to demonstrate the marginal efficiency trade-offbetween risk-
bearingschemes relying on depositors (hence, the deposit insurer) alone andthe entire set of
bankcreditors, including interbank claimants, unless onebelieves thereare important
externalities associated with bank failures; and 2) recentinitiatives by private- and public-sector
participants in the major large-dollar payment systemsto control interbank credit exposures, as
well as extensive explicit and implicit government guarantees, makeacascade of major bank
failuresexceedingly unlikely in the nearfuture. ~
As noted above, abank failure occurs atthe instant in period two at which the failing bank’s loan
value reachesacritical lowerlevel, ZF.5 When thisoccurs, the bank is insolvent (by definition)
and liquidation costs are incurred by the bank’s creditors according to the predeterminedrules
associated with the settlement regime in place, Absent deposit insurance, all banks that hold
8due-from claims on the failingbank incur the liquidation (or state-verification) cost of L, which
is deducted from the liquidation proceeds. At the same time, all the agents whose geographic-
preference shocks caused them to move to the neighborhood in which the bank failed must also
incurthe liquidation cost, since they hold the failed bank’s deposits. An insolventbank i’s
balance sheet at the instant it becomes insolvent is the following:
Bank i’s Balance Sheet atFailure (T=2)
Loan value ZF N Initial deposit obligations
~x0(R+fL)
= Due-to balances




The balance sheet of anotherrepresentative bank appears as follows:
Bankj’s Balance Sheet at T=2
Loan value N Initial deposit obligations
~x33(R+fL)
j~1 = Due-to balances




The agents who arrived atbank i (numbering (N-i)X in expectation and ~ x11 in fact) are each
able to consume only l-S+JL-L, or l-S-(1-f)L, while all agents in other banks consume l-S+fL.
9TotalDeadweight Costs. The total deadweight costs incurred in a system with gross settlement
of interbank payments consist of settlement and liquidation costs. Total costs of settlement are
x~ (R + JL)S. Since every single creditor sues the failed bank for payment, each creditor
1=1 j=1
therebyincurs liquidation costs ofL. Total liquidation costs incurred as aresult of bank i’s
failure are therefore[(N_i) + x1~ ]L.
II. Deposit Insurance
In thisand subsequent sections, I ask the following question: How would agiven set of
payment-system arrangements including deposit insurance and interbank netting agreements
differ from the gross-settlement system described above in the presence of asinglebank failure?
In particular, how would the losses be shared and what are the deadweight costs incurred?
I model a deposit insurer as aprofit-maximizing institution that is constrained (perhaps by law)
to break even in expectation. The fair deposit-insurance premium per unit of deposits,p, is
derived from the deposit insurer’s break-evencondition, NP(l-S) - L = 0, whereP represents the
average deposit-insurance premium per bank, orP = Mp. Since P = L/[N(1-S)1 from the zero-
profit constraint, the premium rate per unit ofdeposits,p, is L/[MN(l-S)]. This obligation
appears on the balance sheet of all banks as of T= 1 after all agents have reached their new
locations, but is not payable until T=2, when all other payment obligationsare settled. The
purpose of adeposit insurerhere is solely to serve as the delegated monitor (in Diamond’s (1984)
sense) of all banks on behalf of depositors. Since any bank that approaches insolvency is closed
immediately whenits net worth, net of all costs, reacheszero, the deposit insurer never absorbs
any losses. Deposit insurance is welfare-enhancing even though thereis no insurance reserve.6
10Eachbank’s interim (T=1) balance sheet differs from the previous casebecause the deposit
interest rate is now simply R=1-S, which benefit is offsetto some extentby the obligation to pay
adeposit-insurance premium, P:
Bank i’s Balance Sheet at T=1 With Deposit Insurance
Risky loan Z, N Initial depositobligations
= Due-to balances






A bank that fails has net worth precisely equal to zero, net of all settlement andliquidation costs:
Bank i’s Balance Sheet atFailure (T=2) With Deposit Insurance
Loan value ZF N Initial deposit obligations
x,~ R
j1 = Due-to balances







All solvent banks pay the deposit-insurance premium but avoid direct liquidation costs:
11Bankj’s Balance Sheet at T=2 With Deposit Insurance
Loan value Z~, N Initial deposit obligations
~x3~R
= Due-to balances






Finally, the depositinsurerjustbreaks even:
Deposit Insurer’s Balance Sheet at T=2
Deposit-insurance premiums NP(1-S) L Allowance for liquidation costs
0 Net worth
Total Deadweight Costs. Total deadweightcosts incurred inasystem with deposit insurance and
gross settlement of interbank payments consist of settlement and liquidation costs. Total costs of
settlement are ~ x,3RS+ NPS. Since only the deposit insurer suesthe failed bank for
i=1 j=~
payment, total liquidation costs are L. Atrade-off of higher settlement costs against lower
liquidation costs defines the potential benefit of deposit insurance as delegated monitoring.
Figure 1 compares expected deadweight costs under various paymentarrangements.
12III. Interbank Netting Agreements
The reason interbank netting agreements may lower systemic risk is that they tendto reduce
direct credit exposuresbetween banks. This procedure is expedient from the standpoint of banks
(including the central bank) that wish to avoidthe inter-bank transmission of economic losses.
However, subjecting asubset of abank’s liabilities to anetting agreement alsoalters the
previously existingrisk-sharing arrangements amongthe bank’s creditors. In essence, netting
imposes adefacto seniority structure on abank’s liabilities even when none exists dejure. This
occurs becausebankj’s claims on bank ithat are included inanetting agreement are satisfied by
extinguishingan equivalent amount ofbank i’s claims on bankj as calculatedatface values. If
the true market value ofbank i’s liabilities is less than their face value, then netting at face values
represents atransfer of value from non-netting claimants toward creditors of bank i that are
includedin the netting agreement.
Bilateral NettingAgreements. The simplest typeof interbank netting agreement is one that
obliges two banks, say bank i andbankj, to settle only the difference between the respective
banks’ claims on each other. In the notation of thispaper, bilateral netting reduces the total
transfer ofthe settlement medium undertaken by the two banks from (x0 +x1~)to xu
withacorresponding reduction in the total deadweight cost of settlement. For simplicity in what
follows, I examine the casein which (only) bank i eventually fails. Since the index is chosen
arbitrarily, I assume without loss of generalitythat bank i realizesanet due-from balance vis-a-
vis banks 1, 2,...,i-1 (i.e., ~ x11 <0), and simultaneously realizes anet due-to balancevis-a-
vis banks i+1,...,N(i.e., x~1 x.~>0). Bank i’s balance sheet then appears as follows:
13Bank i’s Balance Sheet at T=l With Bilateral Netting Agreements and DepositInsurance
Risky loan N Deposits
Due-from balances i1 N Due-to balances






Notice that due-from anddue-to balancesare strictly smaller than was the caseunder gross
settlement. The important implication of this fact is that bank i’s total liabilities have been
reduced, while the amount of insured deposits-- ~ x~R -- has notchanged. Thus, the proportion
of total liabilities represented by insured deposits has increased.
It is now possible to state one version ofthe paper’s main result, namely, that the existence of an
interbank netting agreement shiftsbank default risk toward bank creditors whose claims are not
includedin the netting agreement.
Result 1. The deposit insurer bears alarger proportion of any economic loss arisingfrom abank
failure under abilateral interbank netting agreementthanunder a gross settlement regime.
Proof. Compare the expected T=2 liability structure (viewed at T=0) of bank i both with and
without the bilateral netting agreement. This liability structure implies the sharing rule that
14would apply amongthe failed bank’s various liability holders ifamarginal economic loss of e
were to occur (that is, ifZ~ were allowedto go belowZFby the amount e).
Bank i’s expected liabilities under gross settlement are
E[~x~R]+ (1 +P)E[~xi1R] = (2 +p~N — 1)XR
but the contingent liability of the deposit insurer includes only bank i’s deposits, or (N-l)XR, out
of atotal of 2(N-l)XR owed by bankito the other banks and agents in the economy (i.e.,
excluding the depositinsurer). Hence, the proportion of incremental bankdefault risk borne by
the deposit insurer is exactly one half under agross-settlement regime.
Bank i’s expected liabilities under bilateral net settlement are the following (excluding deposit-
insurance premiums, which net out fromthe deposit insurer’s perspective):7
~ _x1~~]R = (N—1)XR+(1 /2)N~R.
The proportion ofincremental bank default risk borne by the deposit insurer is
(N-i)xR - X 1
(N—i)XR+(1/2)N~R — x+(N/2(N—1))~ 2
15since (N/2(N — i))X <X <X forN>2 andtherefore (N /2(N — i))X <X. Butthis proves
that the deposit insurer bears a larger proportion of any incrementalbank default riskunder a
bilateral interbank netting agreementthanunder agross settlement regime, as asserted. Q.E.D.
Multilateral netting. The presence ofamultilateral interbank netting agreement unambiguously
increases the degree to which bank default risk is shiftedto the class ofnon-netted bank
liabilities (insured deposits in this model). While the risk exposure of otherbanks to agiven
bank i may be positive or zero, depending on bank i’s balance atthe clearinghouse (i.e., after
multilateral netting of interbank claims), the same is not true ofthe deposit insurer. To see this,
examine the balance sheet of bank i under two differentcases, that ofnet due-from andnet due-
to balances:
Bank i’s Balance Sheet at T=l WithAMultilateral Netting Agreement andDeposit Insurance:
NetDue-From Balance
Risky loan Deposits







It is clearin the case ofanet due-from balance that the deposit insurerbears more of the default
risk of bank i than without netting; in fact, the deposit insurerbears 100% of the incremental risk
represented by anydeviation of Z1 belowthe critical level of ZF. It is less obvious, although also
16true,that the deposit insurer bears more default risk whenthe insured bank holdsanet due-to
position at the clearinghouse:
Bank i’s Balance Sheet at T=1 With A MultilateralNetting Agreement andDeposit Insurance:
Net Due-To Balance
Risky loan Z N Deposits







This leads to the second version ofthe paper’s main result.
Result 2. The deposit insurer bears alarger proportion of bank default risk under amultilateral
interbank netting agreement than under either a gross settlement regime or abilateral interbank
netting agreement.
Proof. Compare the expected T=2 liability structure (viewed at T=0) ofbank i with a multilateral
netting agreement, with abilateral netting agreement, andwith no interbank netting agreement.
Once again, note that the liability structure implies the sharing rule that would apply among the
failed bank’s various liability holders if amarginal economic loss of e were to occur (that is, if
Z, were allowed to go below ZFby the amount c). Bank i’s expected liabilities (excluding the
deposit-insurance premium) under gross settlement and under bilateral netting were shown in the
17proof of Result 1. Bank i’s expected liabilities (excluding the deposit-insurance premium) under
multilateral netting with anet due-to balance are:
E[~x~R]+(1/2)E[~x~ — xJ4R]=(N_l)XR+(1 / 2)NXR.
The proportion of bank defaultrisk borne by the deposit insurer is
(N-1)xR - X 1
(N — 1)XR+(1 /2)NXR — x +(N / 2(N — i))~ 2
since (N / 2(N — i))X <X < X forN>2 andtherefore (N/ 2(N — i))X < X, which proves that
the deposit insurer bears alarger proportion ofany incremental economic loss arising from a
bankfailure under amultilateral interbank netting agreement thanunder agross settlement
regime.
The second part ofthe assertion holds if
x+(N/2(N-1)ix> x+(N/2(N-1))x
but thisfollows directly from the fact that X< X. Q.E.D.
18Note that, in the limit-- that is, as the number of independentbanks includedin a multilateral
netting agreement increases without bound-- the proportion ofbank default risk borne by the
deposit insurer approaches one. This is becausethe sum of net interbank balances approaches
zero.8 In practice, alarge multilateralnetting agreement may approach this limit with as few as a
hundred members. CHIPS (the ClearingHouse Interbank Payment System),for example,
reportedly achieves netting ratios in the neighborhood of 95% in its daily clearings.
IV. Illustration ofInterbank NettingAgreements in the Foreign-Exchange Market
In this section, I illustrate the risk shifting that occurs in the presence of interbank netting
agreements with an example set in the context of the foreign-exchange market. I then briefly
discuss the role of acentralbank in the presence of interbank netting agreements.
InterbankNettingAgreementsand the Distribution ofBank DefaultRisk in the Foreign-
Exchange Market: An Example. Consider threebanks, headquartered in the U.S., Canada, and
the U.K., respectively. Suppose that, in the course of one day, the U.S. bank (Bank 1) agrees to
purchase Canadian dollars from the Canadian bank (Bank 2) and agrees to sell a like amount of
Canadian dollars to the U.K. bank (Bank 3). Meanwhile, Bank 2 agrees to purchase British
pounds from Bank 3 in return forU.S. dollars. The specific delivery obligationsthat arise are the
following (where “USD” means U.S. dollars, “CD” means Canadian dollars, and “BP” means
Britishpounds):
• Bank 1 owes Bank 2 USD 30 million;
• Bank I owes Bank 3 CD 40 million;
• Bank 2 owes Bank 1 CD 40 million;
• Bank 2 owes Bank 3 USD 30 million;
19• Bank 3 owes Bank 1 USD 30 million;
• Bank 3 owes Bank 2 BP 20 million.
The banks’ simplified balance sheets in terms oftheir home currency appear as follows before
anyclearing or settlement of foreign-exchangetransactions:
Bank l’s Balance Sheet
Other assets USD Zj USD D1 Insured deposits
Due-from balances (DF1) USD 60 mn USD 60 mn Due-to balances (DT1)
Bank 2 CD 40 mn USD 30 mn Bank 2
Bank 3 USD 30 mn CD 40 mn Bank 3
USD 0L1 Other liabilities
(uninsured)
USD NW1 Net worth
Bank 2’s Balance Sheet
Other assets CD Z2 CD D2 Deposits and other
liabilities
Due-from balances (DF2) CD 80 mn CD 80 mn Due-to balances (DT2)
Bank 1 USD 30 mn CD 40 mn Bank 1
Bank 3 BP 20 mn USD 30 mn Bank 3
CDNW2 Net worth
Bank 3’s Balance Sheet
Other assets BP Z3 BP D3 Deposits and other
liabilities
Due-frombalances (DF3) BP40 mn BP 40 mn Due-to balances (DT3)
Bank 1 CD 40 mn USD 30 mn Bank 1
Bank 2 USD 30 mn BP 20 mn Bank 2
BP NW3 Net worth
20Now suppose Bank l’s net worth is determined by its regulator to have fallen to a critical point
that isjustsufficient to cover the costs ofresolving the bank; in other words, Z1 has fallen toZ~
andNW1 is written down to zero. If the regulator subsequently discovers that the true loss on
Bank l’s assets turns outbe some positiveamount, say $10 million, how will this loss be shared
amongthe bank’s depositors, creditors, and the deposit insurer?
In a gross-settlement regime, the general creditors of Bank 1 have claims totalling D1+DT1+0L1
(I am assuming that all of the bank’s “other liabilities” are uninsured deposits; non-deposit
claims are subordinatedto deposits under FDICIA’s “depositor-preference” regulations). The
FDIC’s share ofBank l’s losses are D1/( D1+DT1+0L1). If Bank 1 has a set ofbilateral netting
agreements forits U.S. dollar transactions with Banks 2 and 3, the FDIC share of Bank l’s losses
remains D1/( D1+DT1+0L1), since bilateral netting of the three banks’ U.S. dollartransactions
makes no difference in the settlement obligations due.9
The liability of the FDIC would be materially higher in this example in the presence of a
multilateralnetting agreementforU.S. dollar transactions, such as CHIPS, or ifthe banks agreed
to net across all currencies simultaneously. To see this, first examine the threebanks’ balance
sheets after multilateral netting of U.S. dollar transactions takes place:
21Bank l’s Balance Sheet
Other assets USD Zj USD D1 Insured deposits
Due-from balances (DF1) USD 30 mn USD 30 mn Due-to balances (DT1)
Bank 2 CD 40 mn 0 Bank 2
Bank 3 0 CD 40 mn Bank 3
CHIPS 00 CHIPS
USD 0L1 Other liabilities
(uninsured)
USD NW1 Net worth
Bank 2’s Balance Sheet
Other assets CD Z2 CD D2 Deposits and other
liabilities
Due-from balances (DF2) CD 40 mn CD 40 mn Due-to balances (DT2)
Bank 1 0 CD 40 mn Bank 1
Bank 3 BP2Omn 0 Bank 3
CHIPS 0 0 CHIPS
CD NW2 Net worth
Bank 3’s Balance Sheet
Other assets BPZ3 BP D3 Deposits and other
liabilities
Due-from balances (DF3) BP 20 mn BP 20 mn Due-to balances (DT3)
Bank 1 CD 40 mn 0 Bank 1
Bank 2 0 BP 20 mn Bank 2
CHIPS 00 CHIPS
BPNW3 Net worth
22All interbank U.S. dollar claims are eliminated in thisexample via the multilateralnetting
agreement. Thus, the FDIC’s share of Bank l’s losses becomes D1/( D1+DT1-30+0L1), which is
clearlygreater than D1/( D1+DT1+0L1), the original exposure discussed above. The holders of
Bank l’s “other liabilities” also bearalarger share of any incrementalloss on Bank l’s assets
than was the case without multilateral netting of interbank U.S. dollar claims.
Netting across all currencies simultaneously in a series of bilateral agreements (i.e., converting
all obligations to a common-currency basis fornetting, as in FXNET, a limited partnership
operatedby 12 major banks in London (BIS 1993, p. 497)) in fact reduces the net due-from and
due-to balances for all three banks to zero in this example. This is because each of the foreign-
exchange transactions in thisillustration is the same size-- each contains one leg that equals USD
30 million. Ifall threebanks agree to convert their interbank obligations to acommon currency
forpurposes of bilateral netting, then all threebanks are able to reduce their interbank exposures
to zero without any settlement taking place. As aconsequence,the FDIC’s exposure to losses
arising from Bank l’s assets becomes D1/( D1+0L1), which is larger still than the exposure under
a multilateral netting agreement covering only U.S. dollar obligations. Obviously, the same
result could be achieved more generally in amultilateral interbank netting agreement that
converted all interbank obligations to a common currency forthe purposes of multilateral
clearing (as is done by MULTINET,a grouping of 11 North American banks, or ECHO, a
clearinghouse being developed by several banks in London (BIS 1993, pp. 497-8)).
This illustration clearly demonstrates that interbank netting agreements reduce interbank credit
exposures and, atthe same time, shift bank default risk to bank creditors whose claims are not
includedin the netting agreements. For interbank netting agreements to live up to their potential
as contributors to greater banking-sector stability, it must be the casethat the risks they shift are
23adequately recognized andcontrolled by the parties accepting them, or atleast, that the
distortions in risk-bearing and-pricingthey create are less costly in awelfare sense than are the
systemic risks they replace.
The Role ofCentral Banks in the Presence ofInterbank Netting Agreements. Central banks of
major countries have been in the forefront ofthe proponents of interbanknetting agreements,
primarily becausethese agreements promise to reduce interbank credit exposures. A
countervailing incentive faced by central banks is provided by their role as creditors (actual or
potential) of largebanks. Giventheir intimate knowledge ofinterbank marketsandrisks, it is not
surprising that centralbanks are diligent in perfecting the collateral interests theyhold in private
banks. From an overall perspective,of course, thispractice merely shiftsbank default risk on to
other creditors, such as the deposit insurer, although it could be arguedthat the financial
integrity of centralbanks is an overriding public priority.
An important example of central bankcredit exposures to private banks lies in the provision of
payment services via transfers ofcentral bank deposits inagross settlement system with intraday
credit extensions (overdrafts), as on Fedwire. The existence of interbank netting agreements
reduces the need forbanks to transact on Fedwire,but, at the same time, these agreements tendto
concentrate bank default risk on the bank’s remaining creditors, oneof whichmay be the Federal
Reserve in the form of adaylight overdraft. As noted above, the Fed is quite aware of the risk it
bears in thiscontext, andhas implemented numerous safeguards, such as debit caps, collateral
requirements, intraday monitoring, and overdraft pricing. To some extent, these safeguards may
be seen as risk-reducing in the aggregate, since they may makebank default less likely. On the
other hand, some ofthe credit-risk protection obtainedby the Fed is purchased by shifting default
risks on to other creditors.
24V. Conclusion
FDICIA sought, among other policy goals, to reduce the extentof bank defaultrisk borne by the
FDIC and, ultimately, by the taxpayer. Various provisions of FDICIA indeed reduce the extent
of bank losses likely to be imposed on the FDIC. Prompt corrective action, structured early
intervention, andbank closure rules that allow the regulatorsto seize institutionsbefore the book
value of equity is exhausted may virtually eliminate multi-billion dollar deposit-insurerlosses in
the event of bank failure. Attempts to reduce regulators’ incentives to declare a bank “too-big-to-
fail” may also lowerthe FDIC’s loss experience.
Aless well-known aspect of FDICIA is its support of interbank netting agreements, whichmay
be an important tool for reducing interbank, or systemic, risk. Bank failures as aresult of
interbank propagation of economic shocks would most likely create large losses forthe FDIC.
Hence, reduction of the risk of such episodes would appear to be consistent with FDICIA’s
emphasis on better protecting the FDIC’s creditor interests in banks. This paper pointsout thata
corollary of the systemic-riskreducing properties ofinterbank netting agreements is the shifting
ofbank default risk away from bank creditors whose claims are netted toward other creditors
whose claims are not netted. In practice, this may meanthat interbank claims and consequently
interbank credit exposures are greatly reduced, while creditors such as the deposit insurer and
holders ofuninsured bank liabilitiesbearthe economic risks avoided by other banks. The
determination ofthe net welfare effects ofinterbank netting agreements is therefore not
unambiguous. Future work may profitably provide quantitative estimates of the trade-offs
described in this paper, or focus in more detail on the role of centralbanks in the payment system
when potentially large amounts of bank default risk are being shifted amongcreditor groups.
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This device is meant to capture the notion thateconomic agents often need to transfer all or part of their
wealth to another location or party. I definethe payment system as that set of arrangements that facilitates
thetransfer ofone’s endowment.
2 In astylized model such as this, one could imagine a ‘leaky bucket’ being used to carry the good
(Calomiris and Kahn (1991)). In the context of a modern payment system, Srepresents all the real-resource
costs associated with paying in cash or otherwise making final settlement.
~Note that the value of due-fromclaims is less than the value ofthe additional deposit obligations created.
Clearly, every bank has the incentive to defect from thepayment system by refusing to accept arriving
depositors’ claims at par. Recall that I simply assume thatthis violation ofbanks’ interimvoluntary
participation constraint is overridden by unspecifiedenforcementmechanisms, such as regulation.
‘~This assumption may also be an accurate description ofthe post-FDICIA environment. Wall (1993)
contends that, “In combination, these factors [FDICIA‘s provisions] should almosteliminatethe risk that
one bank’s failure would cause insolvency atother banks (p. 5).”
~Although this assumption may not be realistic, it does, in fact, capture the intentof recent U.S. legislation:
“FDICIA has mandated that regulators virtually eliminatedeposit insurance losses (Wall, p. 11).”
~Clearly, ifthe deposit insurer is not perfectly able to close a bank when it becomes insolvent, some losses
may occur. A pre-funded insurancereserve to pay offinsured depositors wouldbe desirable in this case if
the deposit insurer’s access to liquidity is limited orcostly.
~SeeCohen and Roberds (1993, p. 6) for a discussion of required settlementflows under gross, bilateral
net, and multilateral netsettlementregimes.
8 In other words, the “netting ratio” approaches 100%, where this ratio is defined as the portionofgross
settlementobligations that are satisfied by offsetting claims in the clearing procedure (and hence, do not
result in any ofthe settlement medium being transferred).
~Bilateral agreements that net interbankobligations across all three ofthe currencies simultaneously would
make an important difference, however, as discussed below.
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